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In late 2017, DuraTable received a number of unsolicited inquiries regarding its interest 
in selling out in a going private transaction, mostly from private equity firms. Since the 
chairman of the board and founder, Gary Reynolds, was approaching retirement age and 
the largest single shareholder who had provided the seed capital to start the company 
was over 80 years old, Mr. Reynolds was willing to consider a sale and provided 
information to four or five of them to prepare bids. DuraTable was a closely held 
company with relatively few individuals holding the vast majority of shares. As such, 
DuraTable’s shares traded infrequently. As a result, Mr. Reynolds questioned if even the 
share price itself appropriately reflected the value of the company. As he looked forward 
to a meeting that would be held with Pierce the following week, Mr. Reynolds asked 
himself, ‘What price would reflect a fair valuation of DuraTable’s operations?’ 
Keywords: acquisition, private equity, small business, entrepreneurship, valuation 
JEL Codes: G32, G34 
I. Introduction 
 
With the start of a new year, DuraTable Inc. found itself weighing the possibility 
of making a new start of its own.   In late 2017, DuraTable received a number of 
unsolicited inquiries regarding its interest in selling out in a going private transaction, 
most from private equity firms.  Since the chairman of the board and founder, Gary 
Reynolds, was approaching retirement age and the largest single shareholder who had 
provided the seed capital to start the company was over 80 years old, Mr. Reynolds was 
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willing to consider a sale and provided information to four or five of them to prepare 
bids.  DuraTable was trading at about $18 per share at the time. 
After receiving indications of interest from three of them, Mr. Reynolds chose 
the buyer he was most comfortable with, and allowed them to come in and perform a 
detailed due diligence.  Once Mr. Reynolds realized that the buyer intended to shut down 
the operations and combine DuraTable with another of their portfolio companies several 
states away from the current location, Mr. Reynolds changed his mind about the buyer.  
He did not want to disrupt the lives of the many employees that had been loyal to him 
over the years since the founding of the company. 
Mr. Reynolds turned to his second choice and asked for a letter-of-intent from 
Heaps Investments, a private equity firm which would keep the operations in its current 
location. In its letter, Heaps expressed interest in acquiring DuraTable’s furniture 
manufacturing operations through a leveraged buyout (LBO). During the weeks that 
followed, DuraTable entertained Heaps’ interest and provided Heaps with the 
operational and financial information it had requested as part of its due diligence process. 
While Heaps was preparing their offer, legal counsel for the board indicated they 
should determine what an appropriate price for the company would be to meet their 
duty of care as board members and avoid shareholder litigation.   
DuraTable was a closely held company with relatively few individuals holding 
the vast majority of shares. As such, DuraTable’s shares traded infrequently.  As a result, 
Mr. Reynolds questioned if even the share price itself appropriately reflected the value 
of the company. As he looked forward to a meeting that would be held with Heaps the 
following week, Mr. Reynolds asked himself, ‘What price would reflect a fair valuation 
of DuraTable’s operations?’ 
 
II. DuraTable Inc. 
 
Located in Boulder, Colorado, DuraTable Inc. was far removed from the central 
hub of furniture manufacturing, usually considered to be High Point, North Carolina. 
Nevertheless, DuraTable had made a niche for itself by providing collapsible and 
stackable furnishings that were both light weight and highly durable.  Its market niche 
had been the highest end of the market with clients which frequently used tables and 
chairs and required tables that could be repeatedly stacked, stored, taken down and put 
in place by workers who were often less-than-gentle with the tables.  DuraTable’s tables 
were capable of sustaining two thousand pounds, whereas competitors’ tables would 
collapse under 400 or 500 pounds of weight.  DuraTable tables typically sold for a price 
premium over most competitors due to their greater durability and compact storage.  
Founded in 1997, DuraTable had grown to a $60 million business by the end of FY 2017. 
DuraTable’s various product lines could roughly be grouped in three categories: 
collapsible (folding) tables, collapsible (folding) chairs, and stackable chairs. The 
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products included in each of these categories were offered in a variety of styles and at 
various price points. Collectively, DuraTable’s product offerings targeted the banquet 
furnishings segment of the contract furniture market. Exhibit 1 shows products 
representative of each of DuraTable’s major product categories.  
Within the banquet furnishings market segment, DuraTable faced two distinct 
groups of competitors. First were the various contract furniture providers that competed 
directly against DuraTable for contracts with hotels, military bases, schools, and other 
institutions.  Notably, among contract furniture providers, DuraTable was somewhat 
unique in its offering of both collapsible and stackable furniture. The second group 
competing directly against DuraTable consisted of companies that manufactured low 
cost, less durable collapsible tables and chairs, including high volume manufacturers such 
as Lifetime Products.   Although DuraTable’s product quality was recognizably superior 
to that of its low cost competitors, the prices charged for DuraTable’s individual 
products were largely governed by the low end alternatives. 
Like most furniture manufacturers, DuraTable was notoriously subject to 
economic volatility, especially in the commercial real-estate market. However, unlike 
many contract furniture providers, DuraTable had shielded itself to some degree from 
this volatility by securing volume contracts with organizations whose growth was largely 
unaffected by economic trends. Exhibit 2 provides a listing of DuraTable’s largest 
customer segments based on sales volume. 
During recent years, DuraTable experienced steady sales growth, with revenues 
increasing from $40 million to $55 million from 2013 to 2016. Net income followed a 
similar trend, excluding FY 2015 (See Exhibit 4).   Forecasts for the coming years indicate 
that growth trends would continue. Revenue is projected to exceed $70 million by 2020. 
During the past five years DuraTable had provided investors with an average 
return of over 14%, a near 2% premium over the S&P 500 Index during the same period. 
However, during this period DuraTable had performed below their industry average 
which boasted an annual return of approximately 19%. 
Beyond its base furniture market, DuraTable had purchased a Canadian 
manufacturer of inexpensive wheeled chairs used primarily in elder-care facilities.  This 
subsidiary represented about $9 million of DuraTable revenues and just under $2 million 
of EBIT.  Although the Canadian acquisition had proven very profitable, a more recent 
acquisition of a manufacturer of inexpensive office furniture had proven disastrous.  The 
acquisition was eventually shut down and sold off in 2012 through 2014.  
In the last few years, DuraTable had developed a roto-molding process with the 
original intent of producing tables that could withstand the outdoors environment.  
Ultimately, the process failed to be stable enough to produce the high-quality tables that 
DuraTable felt necessary to maintain their reputation.  However, one of the engineers 
suggested that the process could be used to produce a fence with much higher strength 
and durability than the common polyvinyl fencing.  By 2006, fence sales were a trivial 
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part of total sales, the costs of development had hurt DuraTable’s margins for the last 
four years, and it was clear that the fence industry was a much more intensely competitive 
industry than DuraTable was anticipating.  In 2006, the fencing product had EBIT of 
negative $1.2 million.  
 
III. Industry Background 
 
The furniture manufacturing industry was made up of two major segments – 
residential and commercial. Of the two, the residential segment was larger, accounting 
for approximately 60% of the industry’s $65 billion annual revenue. The industry as a 
whole was highly segmented with the largest 50 companies controlling less than 40% of 
the market. Additionally, within the industry there were approximately 20,000 individual 
manufacturers. The largest of these manufacturers typically produced a relatively small 
number of standard products in large volumes. In general, as the quality and 
customization of a product increased, the size of the manufacturing firm typically 
decreased. At the extreme upper end, a manufacturer may have only produced between 
one and five pieces of furniture each day, with retail prices ranging from $10,000-
$100,000 per piece.  
Across both the residential and commercial segments, similar products were 
produced using near identical manufacturing technology. The vast majority of products 
produced for either the residential or commercial markets could be classified in one of 
three broad categories: metal, upholstered, or case-good (finished wood) furniture. 
However, because of the relatively small size of many manufacturers, most firms in the 
furniture industry chose to focus on either the residential or the commercial market but 
not both.  A major reason behind this strategy was the highly unique sales and 
distribution networks used within the two segments. Residential furniture was almost 
universally distributed through retail showrooms, such as RC Willey, Ethan Allen, Ashley 
Home Stores, and countless local chains. Commercial furniture, on the other hand, was 
primarily channeled through wholesalers and/or networks of independent dealers. Most 
contract furniture manufacturers, excluding DuraTable, distributed their products 
almost exclusively through the independent dealer networks. DuraTable, on the other 
hand, used a direct sales force that made frequent calls on their major customers and 
spent time establishing new contracts. 
For most contract furniture manufacturers, the dealer networks provided a 
critical link to the end customer. Often it was the dealer rather than the manufacturer 
that would contract with a hotel, school, or other institution to provide the required 
furnishings. The dealer would then seek competitive bids from a number of furniture 
manufacturers. Notably, in the furniture industry dealer contracts were jointly 
nonexclusive. This nonexclusively allowed a dealer to carry many product lines, including 
product lines offered by competing manufacturers. However, it also allowed a 
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manufacturer to distribute their products through multiple dealers within a single 
geographic region. Additionally, these nonexclusive contracts lowered the barriers to 
entry faced by contract furniture manufacturers by allowing even the smallest 
manufacturers access to the marketplace through the dealer networks. In an attempt to 
reduce their supply chain costs, many larger manufacturers and institutional customers 
had recently bypassed the dealer networks and have negotiated contracts directly with 
one another.  DuraTable’s early development of this strategy and sole reliance on its own 
direct marketing force differentiated it significantly from other competitors. 
IV. Heaps Investments LLC 
 
Heaps Investments LLC was founded in 2001 by Ryan Heaps, an early partner 
of the well-known Bain Capital. Heaps’ initial fund of $135 million was largely garnered 
from wealthy individuals including a number of international investors. During the 
decade following its establishment, Heaps had primarily invested in the entertainment 
and communications industries. More recently, Heaps had diversified its holdings 
through the acquisition of a number of national restaurant and retail chains. In late 2017, 
Heaps managed assets valued at approximately $750 million. As was the case with many 
private equity firms, Heaps imposed an annual fee on the total value of its managed 
portfolio plus a percentage of any gains on the value of the portfolio.  
During the first 10 years of its operation, Heaps had gained significant expertise 
in the retail, communication, and entertainment industries. More recently, however, 
Heaps had begun seeking investment opportunities in various manufacturing operations. 
In early 2017, Heaps had taken part in the acquisition of a firm that manufactured non-
durable consumer products. However, Heaps was only a junior member of the 
syndication for the completed the deal and had minimal direct involvement in the 
company’s daily operations. For Heaps, if the deal were to go through, the acquisition 
of DuraTable would be the first time it had taken sole ownership of a manufacturing 
firm and would be its first experience manufacturing durable products such as furniture. 
V. Private Equity Investing 
 
Private equity was an alternative form of investment that involved taking 
ownership in privately held companies. Private equity historically had broadly 
encompassed a number of well-known investment types including: venture capital, hedge 
funds, leveraged buyout (LBO) and mezzanine investments, each of which possessed a 
different risk/return profile.  In recent years, private equity had generally come to refer 
to entities that would singly or in small partnerships acquire entire firms, often publicly 
traded, using high amounts of leverage. 
Private equity firms established serial private equity funds and took a position in 
each.  Private equity funds were generally illiquid, closed-end funds with a lifespan of 10-
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12 years. During its lifecycle, a fund progressed through three distinct stages: fundraising, 
investment, and realization. Over time, private equity firms managed multiple funds, with 
each fund at a different stage in its respective lifecycle. Individual funds were typically 
structured as partnerships between the firm and investors. Investors were generally 
limited partners with the firm being the general partner.  Because private equity funds 
generally operated with a long-term horizon, investors were typically institutions, such 
as foundations, endowments and pension funds, or high net worth individuals and 
families. 
Private equity investing started in 1901 when Carnegie Steel Company of 
Pittsburgh, PA was purchased from Henry Phipps and Andrew Carnegie by J.P. Morgan 
(the man, not the company) for $480 million. A few years later, Henry Phipps used his 
portion of the proceeds, a mere $50 million, to found the Bessemer Trust, which was 
created to invest in private businesses and other exclusive holdings, thus creating one of 
the first firms specifically chartered for private equity investing. 
In an effort to increase the level of investment in entrepreneurial ventures and 
thereby improve the United States’ technological standing in comparison to the Soviet 
Union, the Small Business Act of 1958 was signed into law by President Eisenhower. 
This act allowed licensed venture capital firms, known as Small Business Investment 
Companies, or SBICs, to borrow money from the government at below-market interest 
rates. In turn, these firms would use the government provided funds to invest in a variety 
of small businesses. However, because of the governmental restrictions placed on SBICs, 
SBICs grew slowly. 
Private, non-SBIC firms that offered more flexibility than their government 
licensed counterparts began to grow and gain traction in the marketplace. Within a few 
short years, there were more independent private equity firms than SBICs. One of these 
independent private equity groups, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR), was 
recognized as having completed the first official leveraged buyout (LBO). However, 
because of the broad economic difficulties faced throughout 1970’s, LBOs were all but 
forgotten until the 1980s. Contributing to the broad economic difficulties of the 1970’s 
and the associated decrease in investments was the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which discouraged pension funds from participating in 
any kind of “risky” investments, including private equity. 
In the late 1970’s and early 1980’s private equity investing began to grow steadily. 
Much of this growth resulted from a decrease in capital gains tax and the relaxation of 
some of the ERISA legislation. As a result of these legislative changes, pension funds 
began to invest heavily in private equity. During the decade that followed, LBOs became 
increasingly common. A few well publicized LBOs tainted the image of private equity 
which came to epitomize the “ruthless capitalism” and “greed” pervading Wall Street at 
the time. Various private equity firms chose different paths.  Those that focused on new 
startups (‘seed capital’) or fast growth technology firms became generally known as 
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Venture Capital firms.  Those that focused on a variety of highly specialized and technical 
trading strategies generally became known as hedge funds.  Those that focused on 
purchasing entire firms and used high levels of debt generally became known as private 
equity. 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, private equity rose in popularity. In fact, 
private equity investing had become so main stream that a number of the largest private 
equity firms, including Blackstone Group, had become publicly traded corporations. 
These IPOs had given the more typical investor access to private equity investing that 
had previously only been available to institutions or high wealth individuals.  Accelerating 
the growth in private equity was the huge amount of debt available at historically very 
low rates.  Much of the money buying U.S. debt was coming from foreign government 
sovereign wealth funds and foreign central banks.  The flood of liquidity had dramatically 
reduced interest rates (see Exhibit 8). 
Due to the huge growth in professional money management firms and funds 
starting in the early 1980s, outperforming market indexes such as the S&P 500 on a risk-
adjusted basis became not only difficult but rare, especially after management fees. On 
the other hand, private equity, like other non-traditional asset classes, offered greater 
hope of above market returns. Not all private equity managers had equal access to good 
investment opportunities, management resources, research, and industry expertise. This 
inequality resulted in the best private equity managers leveraging advantages to generate 
above-market returns in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
However, with higher returns came higher risks. Risk measurement in the public 
markets was much less subjective and easier to quantify than in private equity. However, 
private companies and publicly traded companies were quite similar when considering 
fundamental economic risk factors. One large difference was that in the private equity 
market, assets were infrequently valued. 
A typical private equity fund would establish a separate entity (a “fund”), put in 
its own capital as the general partner and then raise additional equity from limited 
partners until it reached the fund target size.  Once a fund was raised, it would be closed 
and the money would be ‘deployed’ on a number of deals in which additional debt was 
raised for each deal, usually three to five times the amount of equity the fund placed in 
a deal.  The debt for each deal was generally raised as nonrecourse using only the assets 
of the acquired company as collateral.  Each fund would have a target life of about ten 
years and then each fund would be ‘harvested’ as each of the deal companies were sold 
or taken public with an initial public offering (IPO) and the funds distributed to the 
investors.  The standard fee arrangement was “2 and 20”, meaning that the private equity 
fund would be paid 2% of the investment amount until harvest and then would collect 
20% of any gain on each company as it was sold or taken public. 
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VI. Estimating a Reasonable Offer 
 
To assist in the board’s responsibilities to determine a ‘full and fair market value’ 
as their ‘duty of care’ required, the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) had prepared the 
forecasts for the next few years.  (See Exhibit 4.)  The projections were in nominal terms 
and assumed an inflation of about 2.5% to 3% per year.  In December 2017, a new tax 
law was passed that reduced the federal corporate income tax rate from 36.2% to 
approximately 21%.  
In the coming years, DuraTable’s combined federal and Colorado state corporate 
income tax rate was estimated to be approximately 24%.  Capital expenditures were 
projected to be about $2.2 million in 2018 and would grow with sales.  Based on 
DuraTable’s current capital structure, the CFO had estimated DuraTable’s weighted 
average cost of capital at 12.5%. 
In addition to their own forecasts, the CFO had sought out a number of public 
companies within the industry that could be used as points of reference (See Exhibit 5) 
in valuing DuraTable’s operations. Each of these firms was notably larger than 
DuraTable and all operated in a slightly different market niche. However, each firm 
derived a significant portion of its income from furniture manufacturing. 
The CFO had also gathered general current and historical capital market 
information that might prove useful in the valuation process (Exhibit 6).  Despite 
relatively low levels of debt, none of the competitors had an investment grade rating; 
most relied on privately placed debt and had never even been rated by the major credit 
rating agencies.  In determining a discount rate, it was well known that investors required 
higher rates on smaller companies than what the Capital Asset Pricing Model estimated.  
The CFO included data for the ‘size premium’ which represented historical data on the 
additional return over the Capital Asset Pricing Model that smaller companies had 
offered (See Exhibit 7). 
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Exhibit 1 – Representative Products 
 
        Rectangular Folding Table      Folding Chair                 Stacking Banquet Chair 
 
Healthcare Chair 
Exhibit 2 – Major Customer Segments 
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Year Ended December 31,               2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
Net sales                               $60,338 $55,701 $50,272 $45,210 $40,965 $40,094
Cost of products sold                      40,793 35,947 33,537 28,037 24,457 23,738
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
Gross profit                               19,545 19,754 16,735 17,173 16,508 16,356
Operating expenses: - - - - - -
  Selling                                     8,760 7,903 7,427 6,452 6,172 6,363
  General and administrative                  2,538 2,012 1,980 1,787 2,504 2,028
  Research and development                    1,548 1,734 1,265 1,393 1,541 1,158
  Asset impairment                               - - 2,226 - - -
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
Total operating expenses                   12,846 11,649 12,898 9,632 10,217 9,549
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
Income from continuing operations                        6,699 8,105 3,837 7,541 6,291 6,807
Other income (expense) : - - - - - -
  Investment income                                 113 310 171 79 229 348
  Interest expense                   (115) - - - - -
  Other, net                                       52 (63) (113) (180) (97) 20
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
Total other income, net                               50 247 58 (101) 132 368
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
Income before provision for income - - - - - -
 taxes and minority interest        6,749 8,352 3,895 7,440 6,423 7,175
Provision for income taxes                    2,302 2,811 1,448 2,766 2,367 2,772
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
Net income before minority interest 4,447 5,541 2,447 4,674 4,056 4,403
Minority interest                                  - - 22 79 07 -
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
Net income from continuing operations $4,447 $5,541 $2,469 $4,753 $4,063 $4,403
Discontinued operations - - - - 745 (271)
Estimated loss on disposal - - - - - (3,256)
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
Net Income $4,447 $5,541 $2,469 $4,753 $4,808 $876
Dura-Table - Consolidated Statements of Income (000's)
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Exhibit 3 (Continued):  DuraTable Historical Financial Statements 
 
 
2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
ASSETS
Current assets:
  Cash and cash equivalents                           $302 $4,787 $3,940 $6,382 $2,203 $8,926
  Available-for-sale securities                          - 4,547 7,151 1,050 2,336 4,593
  Accounts receivable (Net of Allowances) 8,978 6,718 6,463 5,586 3,792 4,382
  Inventories                                             4,763 2,587 2,518 2,339 1,368 1,235
Other current assets 1,166 1,057 1,012 1,826 2,193 5,279
--------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- ---------------
Total current assets                                    15,209 19,696 21,084 17,183 11,892 24,415
Property and equipment, net                             15,734 12,485 11,714 13,230 11,656 6,286
Deferred income tax assets                                    199 248 403 63 376 405
Intangible assets, net 2,371 2,358 2,306 1,136 1,010 932
Other assets, net                                               91 32 109 344 468 1,331
--------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- ---------------
Total Assets $33,604 $34,819 $35,616 $31,956 $25,402 $33,369
LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY
Current liabilities:
  Accounts payable                                    $2,956 $1,989 $1,736 $2,088 $2,184 $1,649
  Accrued expenses and other current liabilities          4,155 2,427 2,616 2,035 1,639 4,401
--------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- ---------------
Total current liabilities                                 7,111 4,416 4,352 4,123 3,823 6,050
Net borrowing on long-term line of credit                3,151 - - - - -
Minority interest - - - 34 125 -
--------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- ---------------
Total liabilities                                        10,262 4,416 4,352 4,157 3,948 6,050
--------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- ---------------
Stockholders' equity: - - - - - -
  Common stock, $.01 par value, authorized 33 40 43 43 41 50
10,000,000 shares, issued 3,334,111
  Additional paid-in capital                            10,725 12,244 12,208 11,469 9,925 11,755
  Retained earnings                                     11,668 17,247 18,337 15,868 11,376 15,615
  Accumulated other comprehensive income                      916 872 676 419 112 (101)
--------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- ---------------
Total stockholders' equity                              23,342 30,403 31,264 27,799 21,454 27,319
--------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- ---------------
Total Liabilities and Stockholders' Equity $33,604 $34,819 $35,616 $31,956 $25,402 $33,369
Net Working Capital as % 10.99% 8.78% 9.21% 8.41% 3.26% -1.08%
Dura-Table Consolidated Balance Sheets (000's)
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Exhibit 3 (Continued):  DuraTable Historical Financial Statements
 
Year Ended December 31,                    2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES:
Net income                                  $4,447 $5,541 $2,469 $4,753 $4,808 $876
Adjustments to reconcile net income to
net cash provided by operating activities:
Net gain on disposal of discontinued operations 0 0 0 - (745) 3,527
Asset impairment                            - - 2,226 - - -
Depreciation and Amortization                                   1,706 1,474 1,830 1,634 1,191 1,178
Deferred taxes                                        63 456 (473) 383 2,511 (1,234)
Loss (gain) on disposal of property and equipment                                          (02) 29 (06) 114 27 04
Tax benefit from exercise of stock options - 314 125 440 37 12
Excess tax benefit from stock-based compensation (23) - - - - -
Stock-based compensation                  307 - - - - -
Changes in assets and liabilities:
Accounts receivable                           (2,257) (180) (652) (1,667) 666 469
Inventories                                     (2,177) (43) (88) (913) (99) 285
Tax receivable                   - - 784 508 (1,120) 865
Prepaid expenses and other current assets (122) (341) 107 (194) 165 (221)
Accounts payable                                    598 194 (420) (137) 511 (768)
Accrued expenses and other current liabilities 1,166 (199) 462 373 (2,775) 2,007
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
Net cash provided by continuing operating activities 3,706 7,245 6,364 5,294 5,177 7,000
Net cash provided by discontinued operations - - - - 2,902 3,217
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
Net cash provided by operating activities 3,706 7,245 6,364 5,294 8,079 10,217
CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES: - - - - - -
Purchases of available-for-sale securities (845) (4,664) (7,591) (1,463) (2,787) (10,673)
Sales and maturities of available-for-sale securities 5,396 7,276 1,478 2,750 5,060 7,241
Proceeds from sale of property and
equipment                                                 17 32 85 01 14 04
Purchases of property and equipment          (4,589) (2,236) (2,142) (3,270) (6,577) (1,198)
Purchase of Versipanel                         - - (1,201) - - -
Net decrease (increase) in other asset, net (64) 77 (30) 87 232 -
Purchase of intellectual property - - - - (82) (50)
Decrease (increase) in notes receivable - - - - - (436)
Purchase of DO Group (net of cash acquired) - - - - - -
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
Net cash provided by (used in) investing activities (85) 485 (9,401) (1,895) (4,140) (5,112)
Net cash provided by discontinued operations - - - - 250 (36)
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
Net cash used in investing activities (85) 485 (9,401) (1,895) (3,890) (5,148)
CASH FLOWS FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES:
Net proceeds from exercise of stock options and                                            
issuance of shares to the  401(k) plan 242 1,123 614 1,181 379 418
Minority interest                        - - (34) (91) (07) -
Proceeds from lines of credit            15,421 - - (336) (11,302) (1,419)
Payments on lines of credit                  (11,690) - - - - -
Tax benefit from exercise of stock options 23 - - - - -
Purchase and retirement of common stock   (12,124) (8,035) - - - -
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
Net cash provided by (used in) financing activities (8,128) (6,912) 580 754 (10,930) (1,001)
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
Net cash used in discontinued operations - - - - - -
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
Net cash used in financing activities - - - 754 (10,930) (1,001)
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
Effect of exchange rate changes on cash                    22 29 15 26 18 1
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
Net increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents (4,485) 847 (2,442) 4,933 (6,723) 4,069
Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of year 4,787 3,940 6,382 2,203 8,926 4,857
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
Cash and cash equivalents at end of year    $302 $4,787 $3,940 $7,136 $2,203 $8,926
Dura-Table - Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows (000's)
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Exhibit 5:  Furniture Manufacturers (January 1, 2018) 
 
Year Ended December 31,               2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Net Sales $62,400 $67,392 $72,109 $76,797 $81,404 $85,475
COGS 41,184 44,182 47,160 50,148 52,994 55,558
Gross Profit 21,216 23,210 24,950 26,648 28,410 29,916
Selling 8,736 9,435 10,095 10,752 11,397 11,966
G&A 2,496 2,682 2,827 2,995 3,134 3,248
R&D 1,548 1,096 1,160 1,224 1,282 1,333
Operating Expenses 12,780 13,213 14,082 14,970 15,813 16,548
EBITDA 8,436 9,997 10,868 11,678 12,597 13,368
- Depreciation 1,498 1,540 1,582 1,593 1,642 1,683
EBIT 6,938 8,457 9,286 10,085 10,955 11,685
AC Steel NRT Mfg MetalTech Edwards Machinery KRC Polymers Jones Mfg
Financial Data ($ 1000s):
LTM Revenues $3,060.0 $2,680.0 $1,820.0 $1,260.0 $982.2 $221.6
LTM EBITDA 254.1 282.0 222.9 69.9 136.6 16.1
Equity 1,238.0 496.4 155.6 427.5 4.4 48.9
Short Term Debt 5.1 29.7 10.4 27.5 3.0 7.6
 Long Term Debt 250.0 286.0 173.2 1.0 347.3 10.2
Cash 527.2 28.0 76.4 35.0 16.0 1.9
Market Data:
Shares (millions) 146.85 47.92 62.92 38.5 42.69 14.38
Share Price $16.34 $44.41 $36.36 $24.30 $22.00 $7.80
Beta 0.81 0.86 0.80 0.87 0.95 0.78
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Maturity Treasurys AA A BBB BB B
1 1.80        1.93        2.05        2.26        3.05        3.41        
5 2.25        2.59        2.73        3.08        4.38        5.14        
10 2.47        3.15        3.29        3.76      5.41        6.33        
15 5.53        3.44        3.69        4.18        6.10      7.26      
20 2.64        3.58        3.82        4.32        6.42      7.74        
25 2.73        3.64        3.82        4.28        6.35      8.12        
30 2.81        3.70        3.79        4.23      6.34        8.11      
Source: Bloomberg
Treasury and Corporate Bond Yields
January 1, 2018
 AAA AA A BBB BB B
EBIT interest coverage 34.9 16.6 10.8 5.9 3.6 1.4
EBITDA interest coverage 38.8 20.8 13.3 7.8 5.1 2.2
Funds from operations/total debt(%) 190.2 76.9 54 34.8 26.9 11.6
Free operating cash flow/total debt (%) 154.6 42.5 30.9 14 7.8 2.1
Total debt/EBITDA (x) 0.4 1 1.5 2.3 3 5.4
Return on capital (%) 30.5 29.9 21.7 15.1 12.6 8.6
Total debt/total debt + equity(%) 13.3 27.6 36.1 45.3 52.9 75.6
Standard and Poor's Ratios: US Industrial Corporations: Median Ratios 
Average Annual Returns Geometric Arithmetic Standard
1926-2017 Mean Mean Deviation
Common Stocks 10.4% 12.3% 20.1%
Small Company Stocks 12.7% 17.4% 32.7%
Long- Term Corporate Bonds 5.9% 6.2% 8.5%
Long-Term Government Bonds 5.4% 5.8% 9.2%
Intermediate-Term Gov’t Bonds 5.3% 5.4% 5.7%
U.S. Treasury Bills 3.7% 3.8% 3.1%
Inflation Rates 3.0% 3.1% 4.3%
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Exhibit 8:  Treasury Rates 
 
 
 
 
 
